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INTRODUCTION
Organizing is hot. Not only did it find unprecedented
attention during the 2008 presidential election, the New York
Times recently carried two stories about organizers and organizing
in the same week. 1 In fact, two of the most famous organizers
known today are also among the world’s most popular figures:
Gandhi and Barack Obama. 2
This Article examines the import of the life’s work of Saul
Alinsky—arguably the most prominent founder of contemporary
organizing—to the content and methodologies of today’s legal
education. I review the community organizing theory and practice
of Saul Alinsky for its synergies and lessons on two approaches of
legal theorists and educators working in law schools today —
“community lawyering” and “social justice” practice.
These
approaches embrace the special responsibility of the legal
profession or the quality of justice in society 3 by extending the
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See Sarah Rimer, Community Organizing Never Looked so Good, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
12,
2009,
at
ST,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/fashion/12organizer.html (reporting
on recent college graduates beginning careers as community organizers); John
Leland, With Advocates’ Help, Squatters Call Foreclosures Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr.
10,
2009,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/us/10squatter.html (describing the work
of community organizers to help foreclosure victims).
2. See Peter Dreier, Organizing in the Obama Years: A Progressive
Moment or a New Progressive Era?, 42 J, MARSHALL L. REV. [we will insert
pade] (2009) (presenting a thoughtful discussion of Americans’ rediscovery of
community organizing during Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign).
3. American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
The Preamble to the ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct provides:
[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal systems, and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice. . . . [13] Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation
of society.
The fulfillment of this role requires an
understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal
system.
Additional directives to lawyers that may address lawyers’ roles outside
of employment in the service of clients and the institutions of justice are
addressed to the lawyer “as a public citizen” and admonish that lawyers
“should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the
administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession” and “should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for
clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen

traditional conceptions of lawyers’ relationships with clients in
ways that are informed by the insights of community organizers,
such as Alinsky. Rather than “justice” or the confrontation, so
often associated with the Industrial Areas Foundation (the “IAF”),
Alinsky’s true touchstone was democratic participation. The
quality of democracy is everybody’s business; and more to the
point of this Article, democracy is not the particular concern of the
legal academy. On university campuses, the study and theory of
democratic participation is more widely the province of
departments of sociology, political science, philosophy, and even
geography, rather than of professional law schools. 4
Extended references to Alinsky are few and far between in
the scholarly output of law professors (at least as published in law
reviews). Why might that be? I begin this inquiry into the
relationship between Alinsky’s ideas and the contemporary legal
academy by imagining the colliding perspectives if Alinsky went to
law school.
My inquiry into potential synergies between Alinsky’s
thought and legal education is a work in progress. For me, law
school followed hard-won social and legal changes in response to
tumultuous political movements in the 1960s and 1970s. By
turns, the Ivy League law school I attended ignored or abused the
abutting ghetto. As a clinic student, my first clients were poor
Black and Latina battered women and families in public housing.
While we pressed individual claims for our clients, we also
supported practical efforts to help women escape from their
abusers, provided legal workshops, and thought of our advocacy
work as educating hearing personnel as well as vindicating rights.
But I had never heard of Saul Alinsky or the IAF. Alinsky’s
teachings began to crystallize for me first as a tenants’ advocate in
Washington, D.C., and thereafter when I joined the new faculty at
legal education.” Id. Furthermore, “a lawyer should further the public’s
understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system
because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular
participation and support to maintain their authority.” Id. For this reason,
each lawyer “should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice
and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot
afford adequate legal assistance” and so, “all lawyers should devote
professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access
to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers
cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal
profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself
in the public interest.” Id.
4. This is a broad generalization of course, but it considers the customary
curriculum, where “democracy” is nominally treated in the study of
constitutional procedures of election and recall, legislation, and judicial
review. As the subject of scholarship, democracy is featured in discussions of
voting rights, corporations’ internal procedures, the design of democratic
deliberation in cyberspace, international contexts, and in the literature
concerning the quality and funding of public education in the U.S.

The City University of New York ( “CUNY”) Law School in 1983. 5
A few years later I moved to the University of Maryland in
Baltimore. 6 I left CUNY for Maryland to develop the law school’s
“legal theory and practice” curriculum (“LTP”), which seeks to
respond to the reality that, no matter how many lawyers graduate
each year, the vast majority of the poor lack access to the processes
of law and the substance of justice. The courses do more than
require pro bono work during the law school years; rather, each
LTP course takes a more intensive integration of lawyers’ work
and study and seeks to make apparent to students the deep
connection between legal rules, lawyers’ choices, and the realities
of the law’s impact on the lives of poor people. 7 And like a number
of my colleagues in law school clinical programs around the
country, I found my way to a whole-hog “community development
practice” after representing individual indigents in an effort to
amplify the potential of law as a means of serving underserved
communities. 8
Meeting Saul Alinsky, an Academic and Experiential Learner
The familiar picture of Saul Alinsky—hard-nosed populist not
enamored with anything academia had to offer. He famously
remarked that academia is irrelevant. 9 He never was a law
5. CUNY Law School, founded in 1983, defines its mission as “training law
students for public service” and advancing social justice. Steve Loffredo,
Poverty Law and Community Activism, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 173, 202-03
(2001). CUNY’s law students reflect diversities not typical of the legal
profession itself. See Id. at 203 n.122 (citing a CUNY law bulletin that
reported that “over 60% of [CUNY] students are women and more than onethird are people of color. They speak more than twenty foreign languages and
are members of over forty ethnic groups.”). Many students have themselves
experienced poverty and welfare, creating at least the possibility for unique
levels of empathy, trust, and understanding with clinic clients. Id.
6. Baltimore’s IAF achieved the first Living Wage ordinance in the U.S.
See Helena Lynch, Industrial Areas Foundation, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 571,
576 (2005-06) (detailing the nationwide living wage movement as it began in
Baltimore).
7. See generally, Barbara L. Bezdek, “Legal Theory and Practice”
Development at the University of Maryland: One Teacher’s Experience in
Programmatic Context, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 127 (1992);
Richard Boldt, et al., Students and Lawyers, Doctrine and Responsibility: A
Pedagogical Colloquy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1107 (1992).
The concept of
professional responsibility embodied in the LTP charge reflected an arguably
vigorous and progressive tradition within the bar. See, e.g., David Luban, The
Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717, 717-18
(1988) (discussing Louis D. Brandeis’s vision of the law practitioner as a kind
of public servant); William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 565-71 (1985) (discussing a
progressive-functionalist vision of law).
8. See Susan Bennett, On Long Haul Lawyering, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
771 (1998) (describing this journey).
9. SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS, at ix (Vintage 1969)
(reissuing for the campus activists of the 1960s his philosophical and tactical

student, but he did attend graduate school. Yes, he was a student
of the rough and tumble world of late 1930’s Chicago, gripped by
the Great Depression and controlled by machine politics and Al
Capone’s Mafia empire. 10 But through much of that decade, he
was a graduate student at the University of Chicago. 11 In 1938,
Alinsky took his graduate degree in criminology and went to work
for a sociologist, who dispatched him to research the causes of
juvenile delinquency in Chicago’s tough “Back of the Yards”
neighborhood, 12 in the shadows of Chicago’s giant Union
Stockyards and the setting of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. 13
Proponents of experiential education will be interested to know
that Alinsky approached this study of gang behavior from the
inside. It was there that he came to view criminal behavior as a
symptom of unremitting poverty and powerlessness. The Back of
the Yards neighborhood was an immense slum. 14 During Alinsky’s
experiential education, he observed that the neighborhood’s
inhabitants were poor and had no job security; in the course of one
year, stockyard wages were cut three times. 15 He also discovered
that he could not stand by as an observer. 16
Alinsky believed that the antidote to the widespread poverty
in the United States in the late 1930s and 1940s was active and
widespread participation in the political process by “the people of
America.” 17 He meant “the sweaty and the suave,” “the grubby
and the grand,” and particularly the vast segment of our people
who were “confined by color to the dingiest of tenements” and by
oppressive labor arrangements to less than their due as
Americans. 18 Americans are due “real equality of opportunity for
all peoples regardless of race, color or creed.” 19Alinsky approvingly
cited Thomas Jefferson’s observation that in every society there
are two kinds of [men]: those who “fear and distrust the people,
and wish to draw all power from them into the hands of the higher
classes” and “those who identify themselves with the people, have
confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest
and safe, if not the most wise depositories of the public

playbook first published in the 1940s).
10. SANFORD D. HORWITT, LET THEM CALL ME REBEL: SAUL ALINKSY, HIS
LIFE AND LEGACY, passim (Vintage Books 1992) (1989).
11. Id. at 14-15.
12. Id. at 47-55.
13. Id. at 55-57.
14. See id. at 57 (describing Chciago’s Back of the Yards neighborhood).
15. Independent
Television
Services,
http://
www.itvs.org/democraticpromise/alinsky.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).
16. Id.
17. SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 12-14 (University of Chicago
Press 1945).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 24.

interests.” 20
America’s “radicals” are those individuals who follow in the
footsteps of Thomas Jefferson and Tom Paine, concerned with the
freedom of peoples’ minds as well as with the economic welfare of
their bodies through high standards of food, housing, and health. 21
The radical believes that universal, free, and equal public
education is fundamental to democracy 22 and that work provides
economic security to the individual while making a contribution as
a “vital part of that community of interests, values and purposes
that makes life and people meaningful.” 23
Methodologically, Alinsky envisioned an “organization of
organizations,” comprised of all sectors of the community—youth
committees, small businesses, labor unions, and the Catholic
Of particular relevance to my remarks in this
Church. 24
symposium is Alinsky’s view of the neighborhood organization. In
Reveille for Radicals, Alinsky took pains to distinguish his vision
for a “People’s Organization” from “community organizing.” 25
When discussing “community organizations,” Alinsky meant
community councils, which he argued were hampered by being too
narrowly place-based and attending to issues too small to redress
the larger injustices of the impoverished masses. 26 He tended to
dismiss community organizations with the aphorism that “an
organization founded on a limited program covering a limited
community will live a limited life.” 27 Today, such organizations
comprise a significant portion of the docket of many law school
community development clinics. Thus, it is instructive to consider
the import of this discrepancy with Alinsky’s understanding of the
relevant sites for significant change.
For decades, community-based organizations have been
involved in what we would recognize as grassroots organizing:
gathering together for collective action, social engagement, and
political expression at the most local levels.
Historically,
organizing has proved its utility as a political practice: a tool to

20. Id. at 16-17 (citing a letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, August
10, 1824). Pressing this point, Alinsky further observes that “[L]iberals like
people with their heads; radicals like people with both their head and their
heart,” and “[L]iberals protest; radicals rebel.” Id. at 27, 30.
21. Id. at 21-23.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id. at 77-87.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 60-61, 64-65.
27. Id. at 184. In Alinsky’s view so narrow a focus reflects static and
isolationist thinking that fails to recognize the functional extent to which the
problems of a local community are malignant microcosms of the larger social
order. “The conventional community council . . . cannot and does not want to
get down to the roots of the problems” and so “retreats into a sphere of trivial,
superficial ameliorations.” Id at 59-60.

politicize and mobilize people who lack access to established forms
of political and economic power. 28 The objective of organizing is to
gain the power to meet the needs shared by the people of
impoverished and oppressed neighborhoods as well as to demand
and instigate change collectively. 29 In Alinsky’s view, people
should form organizations for the “sole reason . . . to wage war
against all evils which cause suffering and unhappiness.” 30
Today’s followers of Alinsky’s IAF tradition define power in
the organizing context “as the ability to act [and] mobilize large
numbers of people in strategic activity designed to counter the
imbalances in political power.” 31 The “Iron Rule”—never do for
people what they can do for themselves—is IAF’s defining icon.
And in some ways, this is the toughest nut to crack when training
law students to be lawyers who can work with organizing
communities.
The Iron Rule expresses the rejection of
relationships in which professionals or outsiders dominate and a
commitment to create active, self-governing citizens and citizens
groups capable of working to pursue collective ends and communal
purposes.
Modern organizing efforts take one of two forms: (1) enabling
communities to solve their problems themselves 32 or (2) mobilizing
people to demand change, whether in the IAF tradition or various
other schools of organizing. 33 Both can be viewed as profoundly
28. See generally id.
29. See Susan Bennett, Little Engines that Could: Community Clients,
Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 469,
469 (stating that “the invocation of community control, of and by poor people,
can be naïve but genuine”); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door:
Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(2001) (discussing the character of neighborhood-based organizations as bound
by shared experiences).
30. ALINSKY, supra note 17, at 132.
31. See, e.g., RINKU SEN, STIR IT UP! LESSONS IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZING,
24-25 (2003) (defining organizing as an effort to build organizations that
include at least these five elements). They are as follows; (1) a clear mission
and goals; (2) a membership and leadership structure, with a way for people to
join and take roles; (3) outreach systems that concentrate on those most
affected; (4) issue campaigns featuring multiple tactics, including direct
action; and (5) pursuit of changing institutions rather than individuals.
32. See generally MIHAILO TEMALI, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES AND TOOLS TO REVITALIZE YOUR
NEIGHBORHOOD (Amherst H. Wilder Foundation 2002).
33. In addition to the 10-day trainings that IAF provides its organizers and
leaders, the Chicago-based Midwest Academy offers Grassroots Organizing
Weekends (“GROW”) where student activists learn the skills of community
organizing; ACORN operates a Leadership School; the People’s Institute for
Community Organizing (“PICO”) offers trainings primarily through religious
congregations. SEN, supra note 31, at xlviii-xlix. Some graduate schools now
offer tracks of study, including a master degree in community organizing. Id.
at xlix. The Gamaliel Foundation, originally formed by African Americans in
Chicago facing discrimination in the attempt to buy housing, reorganized in
the 1980s as a training institute to aid low-income people to form powerful

democratic because both seek the inclusion of the people most
affected by a problem. But the latter more earnestly seeks
inclusion and representation in governance as well as problem
solving. Mobilizing people to demand change most fully embraces
the notion of community organizing as a politically regenerative
movement. It coalesces around the concept that revitalizing
democracy and solving public problems require the creation of
pragmatic relationships between local communities on the one
hand and the political actors and institutions that affect the
communities’ interests on the other. Building these essential
relationships requires connecting individuals to each other and to
a larger organizing effort in order to derive solutions to the public
problems that affect them.
A few years ago, Bill Quigley challenged lawyers and
educators with the observation that traditional legal advocacy
practices fail to serve peoples’ empowerment aspirations. He
argued that community organizing is the essential element of
empowering organizational advocacy.
Unless the lawyer
recognizes that advocacy with groups cannot proceed without
community organizing, there can be no effective empowering
advocacy. In fact, if an organization could have only one advocate
and had to choose between the most accomplished traditional
lawyer and a good community organizer, it had better, for its own
survival, choose the organizer. 34
In this Symposium, we have the opportunity to update our
consideration of these important questions: Can lawyers work with
communities of the poor and powerless without adding to their
oppressions? Can people enhance their own power and
organization if they are represented by lawyers? Can lawyers be
organizers? Can lawyers work with organizers? How can lawyers
work effectively with organized and organizing communities?
What Law School Does to Organizers: Reproducing Hierarchy
Saul Alinsky might never have offered his “Rules for
Radicals” if he had gone to law school, given the inherent social
conservatism of law, legal education, and the elites who, for most
of U.S. history, have had preferential access to these institutions.
Law schooling exaggerates the importance of external rules,
claims and defenses, and analytic reasoning. It treats these as the
subject of thought processes that can and should be conducted
independently from other intellectual processes. Consequently,
this compartmentalizes and demeans the relevance of social
context, moral reasoning, and concerns for justice and equality in
organizations. http://www.gamaliel.org/Foundation/history.htm.
34. William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering
for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 456
(1995).

both the work of “the lawyer’s lawyer” and academic lawyers.
On the other hand, if Alinsky had spent three years in a law
school setting, perhaps he would have ushered in an earlier era of
profoundly critical attention to the role of law in perpetuating the
social status quo, which affected law practice through the 1960s
and burst forth in academia at Harvard Law School in the 1980s. 35
It seems likely he would have agreed with Duncan Kennedy’s
renowned argument that “young initiates in the law are beaten
into submission . . . by a system meant to indoctrinate its enrollees
with the proper attitude toward contemporary corporate
capitalism.” 36 This assertion—originally received by the academy
as “radical” and purposefully politically Left—heralded the now
familiar argument that traditional legal education perpetuates
illegitimate social hierarchies and oppressions. The hierarchies
embedded in the minds of those striving to become lawyers
“contributes to the reproduction of illegitimate hierarchy on the
bar and society.” 37
Kennedy urged law students to resist this reproduction of
illegitimate hierarchy and the “ideological training for willing
service in the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state.” 38 The
pamphlet was initially distributed like an underground manifesto
by a rogue movement of social change agents, ready to bring down
the academy from the inside. Ironically, in the intervening years,
the Critical Legal Studies movement (“CLS”) transformed into a
“mildly irritating but ultimately nonthreatening strain of legal
thought,” 39 and the once-radical tract is now being republished by
an academic press. 40 Both CLS and Kennedy have become
enshrined in the mainstream academy. In presenting Kennedy’s
1983 work to a new generation of law students and legal scholars,
the reissue illustrates the way in which CLS has been neutralized.
The first edition in 1982 opened with David Kairys’s scathing
criticism of law as a tool for maintaining the social status quo. 41
The introduction to the third edition states, “This book, in all three
35. Cf. Robert Coles, Hierarchy and Transcendence, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1487,
1491 (1984) (arguing that law school indoctrinates students to accept the
status quo of societal hierarchy under the law).
36. Id.
37. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, 54 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.
1998) [hereinafter Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy]. The original
1983 pamphlet has recently been republished. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE
SYSTEM (A CRITICAL EDITION) (New York 2004).
38. Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, supra note 37, at 54.
39. Melissa E. Murray, “I’d Like to Thank the Academy”: Eminem, Duncan
Kennedy, and The Limits of Critique, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65-66 (2005).
40. See supra note 38 (noting that Duncan Kennedy’s original 1983
pamphlet was recently reprinted on its own).
41. DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 3-6
(David Kairys ed., 1982).

editions, is an attempt to develop a progressive, critical analysis of
current trends, decisions, and legal reasoning and of the operation
and social role of the law in contemporary American society.” 42
Lawyers for Poor People Striving to Breathe Free
The seeds of change never died in the streets. Action outside
the halls of academia continues to attract and influence the
thinking of scholars and educators. Throughout the antipoverty
activism of the 1960s, law reform efforts drew upon the potential
synergies between activists building grassroots organizations
demanding change and lawyers pursuing legal reform. 43 Some
number of lawyers, community organizers, and scholars saw such
rights-based reform efforts as an important channel for promoting
broader movements for social change. 44 Yet criticism was leveled
by legal scholars and organizers over the disconnect between
lawyers’ court-based strategies and the priorities of the
movements they aimed to advance, 45 arguing that legal campaigns
42. David Kairys, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 16
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 561 n.1 (1983) (summarizing the
movement’s mission of undermining “the central ideas of modern legal
thought,” objectivism and formalism, and characterizing law as “the
expression of a particular vision of society”). Kimberlé Crenshaw illustrates
additional dimensions of the ways that legal education perpetuates existing
hierarchies of power. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a RaceConscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989)
(describing the “perspectivelessness” required of minority law students, who
“must participate in the discussion as though they were not African-American
or Latino, but colorless legal analysts. . .”); Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in
Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988).
43. There are several histories of this period giving due attention to lawyers
and organizers. See generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND
THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 81-95 (1993) (describing the
litigation campaign to establish due process rights for welfare recipients facing
termination of benefits by government); Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families
and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J. L. & POL. 225, 268-69
(1998) (describing the establishment of local community action boards by the
Office of Economic Opportunity to require the “maximum feasible
participation” of low-income people, and the creation at the same time of legal
services agencies, which brought class action litigation on behalf of affected
communities’ interests in fair administration and eligibility standards); JOEL
F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 155-62 (1978) (discussing case studies of social
welfare campaigns that combined litigation with mobilization).
44. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (1995); Edward V. Sparer, Fundamental Human
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
45. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare
System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (1986) (arguing that the reformers’
emphasis on legal rights impeded broader social change efforts). Lucie White
observes that named plaintiffs in change-oriented litigation often had little
contact or relationship with their lawyers. Lucie White, Mobilization on the

to secure fundamental social change are doomed to fail without a
politically engaged social movement. 46 As one commentator
observed, “[t]he proper job for a poor people’s lawyer is helping
poor people to organize themselves to change things so that either
no one is poor or (less radically) so that poverty does not entail
misery.” 47
The criticism that there is a disconnect between lawyers’
strategies and the priorities of the movements for whom they
advocate has spawned considerable reflection by law professors
engaged in progressive practice and education. Professors must
now focus on teaching practices that better train lawyers to
support community-based activism without undermining
community energies by deflecting them into legal campaigns that
make lawyers central. This effort is explained in various ways as
facilitating client empowerment, 48 advancing economic justice, and
resisting systemic social subordination. 49
Gerald López’s pioneering criticism of “generic legal
education” also matured and spread across the academy
throughout the 1980s. 50 López articulated that subordinated
people’s need for lawyers who deploy a set of practices is at odds
with the narrow “conceptions of practice,” 51 which dominates legal
education and the conventional fee-based work that lawyers do.
López coined this approach as a “rebellious idea of lawyering,” and

Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 536 (1987-88).
46. Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversations on Progressive Social
Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1996) (discussing concepts of
political lawyering); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the
Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 68 (2000) (arguing the
importance of poverty lawyers becoming more active in helping client groups
to organize and develop long-term political power); Lucie White, Collaborative
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 157, passim (1994) (discussing how lawyers can augment
their professional training in order to participate collaboratively in work at the
grassroots level to bring about social change); Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law
and Social Change, 13 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (1984-1985)
(“Organized masses of people, not lawyers, play the critical roles” in
movements for social change).
47. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049,
1053 (1970).
48. Scott L. Cummings and Ingrid V. Eagley, A Critical Reflection on Law
and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460 (2001).
49. Lucie White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Drefrontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 742 (1988).
50. See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future
of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1060 n.243 (outlining a
number of works during this period adopting skepticism towards then-typical
legal pedagogy).
51. Gerald López, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and
Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305,
356 (1989) [hereinafter Training Future Lawyers].

his call on the academy to provide training that “reflects (and, in
turn, helps produce) an idea of lawyering compatible with a
collective fight for social change” 52 has been heard in many law
school clinics. Organizing is an essential part of an alternative
conception for constructive rebellion, and thus the familiar tools of
organizers merit inclusion in a lawyer’s expanded skill set. 53
To anticipate and respond to the concerns of people who are
politically and socially subordinated “demand[s] a range of
practical know-how and intellectual sophistication” well beyond
competence in litigation. 54 López and others suggest a range of
skills that must be taught to law students planning to work with
subordinated people. This range of skills requires that lawyers
know how to work with clients and not just on their behalf; it
demands knowing how to collaborate with allies rather than
ignoring their actual or potential role in the situation; it demands
knowing how to take advantage of and how to teach self-help and
lay lawyering and not just how to be a good formal representative;
it demands knowing how to be a part of, as well as knowing how to
build, coalitions, and not just for the purposes of the filing of a
lawsuit. 55
A number of law school clinics and innovative legal advocacy
organizations now play a key role in developing a new public
interest practice informed by the critical poverty law scholarship
of past decades. 56 A rich vein of social justice teaching persists in
the classroom and the experiential courses of the nation’s law
schools. 57
52. Id. at 305; see also Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1,
2 (1984) [hereinafter Lay Lawyering] (describing lawyering as problem
solving).
53. See Training Future Lawyers, supra note 51, at 325 (observing that
students often come to realize that the “law simply offers no adequate
response to the community problem,” and thus “they have to . . . engage in
community organizing and empowerment to assist the community in working
on its own issues”).
54. See Training Future Lawyers, supra note 51, at 356. See also Lay
Lawyering, supra note 52, at 2.
55. Lay Lawyering, supra note 52, at 2.
56. Lawyers across a variety of practice settings work collaboratively with
clients, communities, and activist groups to pursue collective, multifaceted
approaches to fighting subordination and effecting social change. See, e.g.,
Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 546-63 (1987-88)
(examining two case studies of “mobilization on the margins of litigation”);
Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 674-82 (1992);
Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 407, 428-50 (1995); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and
Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879, 1905 n.113 (2007) (describing
pervasive influence of critical poverty law scholars on public interest practice).
57. Some scholars have defended the importance of offering students

REFORM THEORY AND PRAXIS IN THE ACADEMY AND IN THE STREETS
There has been a surprising transformation in the way
political activists within legal academia think about achieving
institutional change. A prior generation of activists believed they
should pursue institutional reform and, sometimes influenced by
Saul Alinsky’s confrontational model, 58 embraced organizational
change agents in the roles of provocateurs or angry oppositionists.
This earlier approach to reform advocacy had as its hallmarks
confronting power, stirring things up, demanding recognition, and
forcing concessions. Protest was heated, defiant, righteous, and
intended to be empowering to those who engaged in it. 59
Yet today, that ethos has been largely replaced —most
strikingly among activists who self-identify as operating in the
community organizing tradition—by approaches that emphasize
“negotiated
relationships,”
“power-sharing,”
and
“new
experimentalist approaches to public problem solving.” 60
Reformers across the political spectrum express zeal for
collaboration models. 61 One can scarcely locate an oppositional
politics in American law school clinics today. 62
“impractical theory,” particularly for those students committed to careers in
law reform or public service. Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students as
Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993). Students, they
argue, need exposure to nontraditional legal theories, so that they can “write
briefs that effectively challenge the many injustices that now threaten our
society in ways so dire, so dangerous, that few in policymaking positions are
willing even to contemplate, much less attempt, much-needed reform.” Id. at
2026.
58. Alinsky frankly defended the use of irreverence and profanity, because
of their utility in goring the “sacred cows.” ALINSKY, supra note 9, at xiv. The
argument was taken up by activists and theorists in the succeeding generation
also. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC.
CHANGE 369, 391-405 (1983).
59. See SUSAN D. CARLE, LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 230-37 (2005) (summarizing and providing
examples of the earlier literature on oppositionalist lawyering for social
change).
60. Julissa Reynoso, The Impact of Identity Politics and Public Sector
Reform on Organizing and the Practice of Democracy, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 149, 164-66 (2005) (describing new forms of collaborative governance
between community organizations and government).
61. See Carle, supra note 59, at 145-47.
62. See, e.g., Susan R. Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and
Practices of Community and Economic Lawyers, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 437, 44143 (2002) (discussing “enhanced strategic collaboratives” between low income
neighborhoods and local business communities); Robin S. Golden & Sameera
Fazili, Raising the ROOF: Addressing the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis
Through a Collaboration Between a City Government and a Law School Clinic,
2 ALB. GOVT.’L L. REV. 29, 33 (2009) (describing a collaboration between Yale’s
legal clinic and the city of New Haven and arguing that such clinic
partnerships with local government can introduce students to an expanded
range of roles for lawyers “beyond the adversarial and client-centered

Changes in These Times: New Governance
In important part this shift reflects changes in the roles and
structures of government, which present new opportunities and
imperatives for new forms of law practice.
In the 1980s,
government agencies began to jettison some of the command-andcontrol regulatory apparatus that defined state and federal
governance. Instead, much ‘new governance’ grants to state and
local jurisdictions the flexibility to experiment with incentives for
socially desirable behaviors within the ambit of antipoverty
programs such as welfare, work rules, and subsidized housing. 63
As the modern state requires more local knowledge and flexibility
to adjust to the new role of the regulatory state, some theorists see
a new dawn for democratic opportunity that organized
communities can play. To believers in the organizing movement,
community-based organizations are sites for the development of
countervailing power and incubators of solutions to complex public
problems. A number of legal scholars argue that it is a positive
development that “[p]rivate actors are deeply involved in
regulation, service provision, policy design, and implementation.” 64
Others describe the privatized new governance norm as
“democratic experimentalism,” a new form of government where
power is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to utilize
their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual
circumstances. 65
For poor people and their communities, three procedural
assumptions than current community and economic (CED) work”); Louise G.
Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives:
Multidisciplinary Practices for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227, 227-72 (2000)
(collecting “innovative practices” and discussing how these can achieve social
change).
63. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: the Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47
(2004) (detailing legal theories that together comprise the ‘new governance’
model); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:
Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121,
1126-27 (2000) (describing the evolution of welfare administration and its
effects on welfare recipients).
64. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000). Susan Bennett, however, identifies both
negative and positive of relying on CBOs for services and for the promotion of
local democratic participation. Bennett, supra note 29, at 470-73.
65. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). Dorf and Sabel also suggest
that in this new phase of U.S. democracy, regional and national coordinating
bodies will require actors to share their knowledge with others facing similar
problems. Id. at 404-18. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:
Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 553-59 (2008) (critiquing Dorf and Sabel’s theory as it has played
out for antipoverty policy in the United States).

consequences of these changes in governmental operations bear on
this Symposium’s topic. First, the forum shifts necessarily from
courtrooms to administrative and community settings. This
reflects the diminution of due process rights governing the receipt
of important household benefits. A corollary of this change is, the
fact that much advocacy in the post-welfare era takes place in
forums that are more accessible to individual claimants and their
organizations, 66 meaning that lawyers need not be pressed into the
role of gatekeeper.
Second, the forum flexibility invites innovative roles for
lawyers working with communities, in light of this diminished
importance of the traditional attorney-client relationship in
shaping public benefits advocacy.
Third, the denouement of procedural rights for the poor
underscores the utility of coalition work. Building effective
coalitions among those hurt by public policy as well as between
communities and lawyers (and others, including organizers) is all
the more important as due process protections are removed.
Coalition building is hard work. For one thing, it tends to require
more trust and open communication than may be the norm among
community-based organizations or between lawyers and clients.
Engaging lawyers to participate in community mobilizations, in
ways that do not adhere in some articulable way to the lawyerclient relationship, may deter many pro bono lawyers from
investing time and resources in an agenda that appears exceed
what is legally or politically feasible.
For their part, community organizations may be unwilling to
pursue cooperative agreements with public institutional actors
who experience teaches them to distrust; some may be unable to
collaborate with other community actors without the extended
facilitation that Alinsky meant to be provided by professional
organizers. 67 Just as López raised awareness of lawyers’ need to
broaden their skill sets to work effectively with community based
groups—by moving beyond litigation and traditional deterministic
legal analysis—community clients and their organizations are
likely to need to diversify their advocacy arsenals without allowing
their old confrontational tools to rust.
Changes in Poverty Characteristics from Alinsky’s Day to Ours:
Implications for Communities, Lawyers, and Organizers
The persistent concentrations of urban, mostly minority
poverty in the face of an unprecedented twenty-year period of
66. See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the
Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 889
(2004)
(observing that “[l]ittle of the important work in transforming
Medicaid and the food stamp program required a bar card”).
67. ALINSKY, supra note 9, at 112-52 (discussing the necessary traits of a
person doing organizational work).

national affluence pose a grave challenge to the democratic
principles and values of this nation.
The challenge is to
foundational values of freedom and opportunity that are deeply
held by citizens of any major political party. We have no effective
national policy or coherent ideology to combat this economic and
social reality. A family that cannot pay its bills is not free. A child
denied a good education is denied equal opportunity. A minority
child—growing up in an urban area lacking living wage jobs and
beset with drug abuse, violent crime, failing schools, and the other
socially dysfunctional problems so common in our “ghetto areas”—
scarcely has the same opportunity to succeed as a white child in a
suburban neighborhood. 68
In our time, the gap between rich and poor has continued to
widen in the United States as well as worldwide. 69 Poverty in
America is again on the agendas of policy makers, and so is
concern that poor people are particularly disadvantaged by the
provisions and processes of the law 70 and by the inaccessibility of
legal services for people without the means to pay. 71 I submit that

68. Gregory L. Volz, Keith W. Reeves, & Erica Kaufman, Higher Education
and Community Lawyering: Common Ground, Consensus, and Collaboration
For Economic Justice, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 505, 506-07 (2002).
69. JUDITH GOODE & JEFF MASKOVSKY, THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001). Henry Rose,
Retrospective on Justice and the Poor in the United States in the Twentieth
Century, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 591, 600 (2005).
70. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1013, 1021 (2004) (“[M]ost legal academics have done little to educate
themselves, the profession, or the public about access to justice and the
strategies necessary to increase it. . . . [W]e are not shouting from rooftops
about unmet needs; we are not, for the most part, even murmuring in
classrooms or muttering in law reviews.”); see also John O. Calmore, Social
Justice Advocacy in the Third Dimension: Addressing the Problem of
“Preservation-Through-Transformation,” 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 615, 632 (2004)
(noting that one criticism of legal education is that “law school fails to produce
public spirited and socially responsible lawyers . . . .”).
71. The Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) undertook a study to determine
the extent to which low-income Americans were unable to secure access to civil
legal assistance. The report, “Documenting the Justice Gap in America—The
Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans,” concluded that
“[a]lthough state and private support for legal assistance to the poor has
increased in the last two decades, level (or declining after factoring in
inflation) federal funding and an increased poverty population have served to
increase the unmet demand.”
LEGAL SERVICES CORP., OVERVIEW OF
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA—THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL
NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
2
(2006),
http://
www.lsc.gov/press/documents/JusticeGapReportOverview120105.pdf (quoting
report
overview
with
the
full
report
available
at
http://
www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSCJusticeGap_FINAL_1001.pdf).
The
research preceded the vastly increased need for legal assistance that resulted
from the impact of Hurricane Katrina by a greatly expanded population of
people eligible for subsidized legal services.

concern about poverty’s ills for persons and for the quality of
democracy has persisted among a number of professors and law
school programs. These actors have been striving to instill in law
students the imperative to pursue social justice since the time of
Reveille. This is evident in efforts to reform law’s substance, 72
practice and politics, 73 and variously as an aspect of a lawyer’s role
and professional responsibility. 74 This is distinct from the more
general conversation within the legal profession about access to
justice, rather than justice itself, 75 which expresses the sentiment
that access to the legal system, though critical to many when
meaningful, does “not capture the full range of legal inequality
that affects people and communities.” 76
In important respects, the communities where today’s poor
live are dissimilar from those of past generations.
Past
generations suffered poverty as a result of deprivation, lost
opportunity, and exploitation, but they experienced oppression
72. Academic lawyers have contributed voluminously to the ideas and
arguments to counter public policies that affect people by dint of their poverty,
welfare receipt, social status, health, homelessness, and so on, as a few
moments on Lexis or Westlaw search engines will attest. The legal landscape
for the poor, as well as for lawyers for the poor, changed dramatically from the
1960s to the 1990s. Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New
Agenda for Poverty Lawyers, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547 (1998).
73. See generally GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE
CHICAGO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
74. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role
of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
997, 1011 (2004) (arguing that in order to increase the number of law school
graduates who embrace a professional responsibility to assure access to justice
for the poor, clinicians must strive to inculcate in their students an
understanding and compassionate concern for the plight of people living in
poverty as well as a sense of professional responsibility for increasing their
access to justice).
Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 288
(2001) (asserting that “[a] provocateur for justice actively imbues . . . students
with a lifelong learning about justice, prompts them to name injustice, to
recognize the role they may play in the perpetuation of injustice and to work
toward a legal solution to that injustice.”); Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for
Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1470-78 (1998) (describing
the resurgence of clinical work as a vehicle for instructing law students on the
importance of social justice concepts).
75. Deborah L. Rhode discusses the responsibility of legal educators to
instill professional values. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 191-93
(2004). “Legal education plays an important role in socializing the next
generation of lawyers, judges, and public policymakers. As gatekeepers to the
profession, law schools have a unique opportunity and obligation to make
access to justice a more central social priority.” Id. at 193. See generally
Symposium, The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 277 (1992) (providing commentary on the social justice mission of law
schools).
76. EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., PURSUING EQUAL
JUSTICE: LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2002),
available at http:// www.aals.org/equaljustice/final_report.pdf.

within the national economic and social system. 77 Insofar as their
experience occurred within this system, they had at least some
potential for escaping poverty and climbing into a higher rung of
society. Conversely, today’s inner-city poor do not experience
inequality within the national economic system; rather, they are
entirely removed from it and are treated as simply superfluous to
economic and societal organization.
William Julius Wilson has observed that to resolve the
structural causes of concentrated poverty will require “radicalism”
not yet apparent in the public policy objectives of either dominant
political party. 78 He argues that it will take a multiracial coalition
to mobilize the necessary political support and the financial
resources to put an intervention strategy into action. A number of
activists and scholars see that potential in today’s growth of
grassroots support for economic justice initiatives, specifically, in
citizen-led initiatives striving to rebuild the business and economic
infrastructures in some of our impoverished areas. 79
Alinsky asserted that active people’s organizations would
bring greater ‘democracy,’ by which he meant political
participation in the call upon government and the distribution of
social goods. While much of what he said advocated for greater
material and social well-being in the forms of work, pay, and
creative scope, his writings do not address how democracy creates
social justice among contending interest groups.
I suspect that among many lawyers and law professors, there
is greater hope that a more just ordering can be articulated
through law, rather than through politics. Elaborating this
disjunction fully is beyond the scope of this Article, but I offer two
observations.
Democracy is the Workhorse
Although I speak here of colleagues who embrace social
justice teaching, I assume that others in the legal academy and
the legal profession also care deeply about achieving social justice.
No one is against social justice until we begin to articulate what it
should look like—how governmental powers, individual rights, or
77. See Ashar, supra note 56, at 1943-46 (discussing what Michael
Harrington called “new poverty” (citing MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW
AMERICAN POVERTY 9 (1984)).
78. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, at ix (1987); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR, at
xiii-xiv (1996).
79. See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY
(2001); CED enables the power of collective activity to support low-income
communities. It allows poor citizens to experience how capitalism can work for
them, instead of their more common experience of how its residual effects bar
them from economic opportunity.

tax laws should be revised to achieve it.
Alinsky’s answer to this endemic problem lies in his view of
the origins of shared knowledge and collective power. He explains
that empowered active people’s organizations are “brought
together”—the “native leadership” of a community’s many
associational circles could become friends and see their common
humanity. People are “organized” when they are brought together,
get to know each other’s point of view, and discover that many of
their individual problems are common to all. 80 Although he
surmised that “all people [interested in a People’s Organization]
support” general elements of a people’s program “such as medical
care, full employment, good housing, good schools, equal
opportunities,” and above all,
[T]he real democratic program is a democratically
minded people—a healthy, active, participating,
interested, self-confident people who, through their
participation and interest, become informed, educated,
and above all develop a faith in themselves, their
fellow men, and the future. 81
And yet, to lay the burden of social and economic community
renewal on poor people getting by in poor neighborhoods, what
exactly do we presume?
[T]o ask those with the fewest capital, institutional,
and human resources to draw on those resources to
better their lives; to ask those whose trust has been
betrayed over and over . . . to join a process
requiring significant trust; and to ask the excluded
to be responsible for finding a way to become
included. 82
Teaching Social Justice and Social Justice Lawyering
As noted at the outset of this paper, the explicit goals and
values of the legal profession do not include the pursuit of social
justice. 83 In 2004, Deborah Rhode published a stinging critique of
80. ALINSKY, supra note 9, at 53-54.
81. Id. at 55.
82. Bennett, supra note 29, at 470 (quoting ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING
THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1995)).
83. By contrast, the code of ethics for the National Association of Social
Workers articulates as a “core value”: “Social workers challenge social
injustice. Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on behalf
of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of people” and “seek to
promote . . . knowledge about oppression; . . . equality of opportunity; and
meaningful participation in decision making for all people.” The National
Association of Social Workers, http://socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp.

law schools for their failure to embrace a justice mission and
complicity in the pervasive denial of access to justice to the poor. 84
There is a small groundswell within the legal academy to
encourage law students in the challenges of lawyering to promote
social justice. In their eponymous casebook, Professors Mahoney,
Calmore, and Wildman define social justice to mean the
“elimination of . . . institutionalized discrimination,” “[p]romoting
individual and collective well-being, enhancing human dignity,
and correcting imbalances of power and wealth.” 85
Pre-eminent clinical scholars Jane Aiken and Steve Wizner
argue for teaching “social justice lawyering” in law clinics,
beginning with nurturing students’ “capacity for moral outrage at
the injustice in the world.” 86 Increasingly, clinical professors are
beginning to articulate frameworks for teaching the essential
skills and methods of social justice lawyering, although
distinguishing these skills from the objects of social justice
lawyering is still an emerging endeavor. 87 Calmore stresses the
importance, and possibility, of teaching our students to hope.
“[O]ur social justice students need more from their professors than
sophisticated analysis; they need inspiration. While ready and
able to deliver the analysis, we are less attuned to the need—or
less confident in our ability—to deliver the inspiration.” 88 “Law
teachers in this vein strive to prepare students for the world in
which they will practice, including the struggles that poor
communities face and the ineptitudes they may carry with them, if
they do not become attuned to the professional values and norms
that often act to reinforce inequity and the status quo.” 89
Calmore and others make the observation that “[t]raditional
law study, both in terms of course offerings and teaching
methodology, may detract from learning the lessons of social
justice.” 90 The “better” a student becomes at the study of law, the
more difficult pursuing social justice may become because of the
84. Rhode, supra note 70, at 156-60.
85. MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN O. CALMORE & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 1 (2003). “Social
justice lawyering seeks to give material meaning to these ideals in the daily
lives of individuals and communities that are marginalized, subordinated, and
underrepresented.” Id.
86. Wizner & Aiken, supra note 74, at 1009.
87. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in
the Old and New Curriculum, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1391, 1395 (2007);
Lauren Carasik, Justice in the Balance: An Evaluation of One Clinic’s Ability
to Harmonize Teaching Practical Skills, Ethics and Professionalism with a
Social Justice Mission, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 23 (2006).
88. Derek Black, Turning Stones of Hope into Boulders of Resistance, 86
N.C. L. REV. 673, 677 (2008).
89. Id. at 684; see KENNEDY, supra note 37, at 54.
90. John O. Calmore, “Chasing the Wind”: Pursuing Social Justice,
Overcoming Legal Mis-education, and Engaging in Professional Resocialization, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2004).

professional embrace of the notion that lawyers are simply amoral
agents that operate within these structures, regardless of whether
these structures are oppressive. 91
Necessarily, one of the first tasks is to help students
understand who their most marginalized clients are, which
includes understanding clients in a context beyond what their
legal claims might look like. Because poor Americans experience
poverty “not simply as individuals, but as members of a poor
community,” 92 the history of peoples’ struggles and the roles and
skills of organizing are important elements of training today’s law
students to be agents of democracy-serving legal action.
Lawyers who have learned respect for their clients’
communities can practice law in a manner that is responsive to
and respectful of the needs and autonomy of marginalized groups.
This methodology features “collaborative work with the client
community,” “dialogue and mutual education . . . strategic work,” 93
and helping communities “learn how to interpret moments of
Social justice
domination as opportunities for resistance.” 94
teachers agree with the primary message of organizers that
responsive lawyering requires an attorney to relinquish her power,
leadership, and hierarchical position over clients.
According to Calmore:
[W]e cannot come into the picture with canned
claims and prayers for relief. We must be open to
being used by the client community in ways that
they deem appropriate. We can provide technical
assistance and advocacy perspective; we can
enhance their stories; and we can help them
leverage their positions. . . . [W]e can join the
political project by occupying the real-and-imagined
worlds on the margin and helping the community to
reclaim these spaces as places of radical openness
and
possibility. 95
91. Id.
92. John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of
Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1927, 1943 (1999). Calmore forewarns law students that social justice
lawyering is not a theoretical or legally intuitive exercise, nor glamorous work,
but instead is grounded in communities that may be foreign to the students,
yet in which they as attorneys must immerse themselves to gain
understanding, competency, and the community’s trust. Id. at 1932-36. See
also Black, supra note 88, at 688.
93. Calmore, supra note 90, at 688.
94. Id.
95. Calmore, supra note 92, at 1950; White, supra note 46, at 160-61; Scott
L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics:
Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399,
426-28 (2001).

The organizer’s toolkit is making its way into clinical and
classroom courses, refashioning the images of what lawyers “do.”
Understanding people in their context, cultural competence, deep
listening, relating to others’ humanity, and liking people—all are
at last getting their due. Fundamentally, though, the take-away
from reading Alinsky is for lawyers—aiding communities in their
recovery and rebuilding, seeking to serve social justice and deepen
democracy—to aid the poor and oppressed of America to shatter
the shell of isolation that keeps them outside of democracy’s
mainstream.
TO ‘SHATTER THE SHELL OF ISOLATION’: LAW ALONGSIDE
ORGANIZING AS COMPLEMENTARY DISCIPLINES FOR DEMOCRACYBUILDING
Alinsky’s understanding of the possibilities for citizen-led social
change hinged on “indigenous leadership.” Alinsky emphasized
that poor people should do the work themselves. The objective is
not the end in itself, but the quality of “Popular Participation.” 96
There remain important settings where lawyers are needed to
do what organized communities cannot do for themselves—most
paradigmatically, to sue. Whereas community organizing and
community lawyering strive to build networks that empower
people, social change litigation is intended to establish rights or
clamp the brakes on norms of subordination. Litigation to halt the
demolition of public housing in post-Katrina New Orleans, to
redirect the public transit dollars to serve the Los Angeles bus
riders, and to equalize the expenditure of public school funding,
are all efforts to change the rules of the systems that ensnare the
poor and powerless. These examples illustrate that it is entirely
possible for litigation strategies to grow out of, and to complement,
constructive and empowering social movements, 97 rather than for
“the lawyer and the litigation process itself [to] become agents of
client subordination.” 98
Poverty and subordination may isolate people who share
common burdens created or perpetuated by the rules and norms of
96. ALINSKY, supra note 9, 174-80. See Julissa Reynoso, The Impact of
Identity Politics and Public Sector Reform on Organizing and the Practice of
Democracy, 37 COL. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 149, 158-67 (2005) (discussing of
changes underway within the contemporary organizing movement so as to
become more reflective and responsive to issues of identity and concern as to
race, ethnicity, and gender issues).
97. See generally PENDA D. HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS,
COMMUNITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (2001) (recounting a dozen
complementary instances of litigation alongside popular organizing, including
the Los Angeles Bus Riders Union).
98. Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering: An Approach to
Addressing Inequalities on Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and
Immigrant Communities, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y. 35, 49 (2004).

society’s laws. We need not prioritize one lawyering model over
the other, particularly as we come to understand the ability of
different models to operate compatibly. Lawyers, communities,
and organizers likely have much more to learn about effective
empowering collaborations. The diversity of organizing traditions,
settings, and tactics is perhaps as much a barrier as it is an
Alinsky-esque antipathy to lawyers.
Lawyers, clients, and
organizers can perhaps more fully articulate and appreciate the
distinct dynamics of communities’ justice work when the
community elects to engage in community development,
community building, or community organizing.
The ongoing collaboration of lawyers with dozens of
community-based groups in post-Katrina Biloxi, Mississippi,
illustrates a high degree of collaboration by empowered
community clients with lawyers who adopted a “community
lawyering” approach that aligns most completely with community
organizing in the pursuit of political enfranchisement and
governmental accountability. In this way, it differs significantly in
form and aim from numerous sites of community lawyering within
law school clinics that represent nonprofit organizations engaged
in community development or community economic development. 99
The grassroots Steps Coalition, formed following Hurricane
Katrina, joined in outrage over the failure of state and local
officials in their stewardship of recovery efforts for people on the
The Coalition launched its “People Before Ports
Coast. 100
Campaign” to challenge Mississippi governor’s misdirection of
$600 million in federal recovery funds to expand the Port of
Gulfport. 101
Large portions of the housing stock in coastal counties was
destroyed or rendered uninhabitable by Katrina. 102 Rents in the
apartments that were still livable rose by thirty to fifty percent. 103
Destruction of affordable housing stock, developer-driven
zoning decisions, and the decision of Mississippi’s Attorney
General not to regulate price gouging for private rental housing
resulted in the permanent loss of affordable housing, historic
neighborhoods of color, and small Vietnamese fishing businesses,
104 while casinos and high-end condominiums sprouted with
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May
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2007,
available
at

governmental aid. 105
The Mississippi Center for Justice (“MCJ”) became the central
gathering point for the thousands of law students who flocked to
the Mississippi Gulf Coast to provide Katrina legal assistance. 106
MCJ was founded in Jackson, Mississippi, in 2003 by local civil
rights leaders to create a new capacity in the state: a home grown,
nonprofit public interest legal and policy organization that
advances racial and economic justice through systemic change. 107
From the beginning, MCJ carried out its mission through a
“community lawyering” approach and combined traditional legal
strategies with policy advocacy, grassroots community organizing
and outreach, convening of stakeholders, coalition-building, media
advocacy, and public education. 108 In its first two years, MCJ
provided legal advice and research to local campaigns to create
better futures for low-income Mississippians and communities of
color in the areas of health, education, economic justice, and child
care. 109
When Hurricane Katrina devastated the Mississippi Gulf
Coast in 2005, MCJ opened its Katrina Recovery Office in Biloxi
with two objectives: to respond to the overwhelming legal needs of
individual survivors and influence recovery-related policy
decisions. 110 Mississippi’s legacy of race and class discrimination
was mirrored as a defining feature of the recovery—policy makers
directed most of the recovery funds to homeowners, higher-income
From environmental policy to
survivors, and businesses. 111
“NIMBYism” and local government decisions about placement of
Katrina cottages to the failure to remediate mold in public housing
projects, racism was—and continues to be—profoundly present in
the recovery.
Community lawyering is likely to be better suited where there
is a mobilized community—people who see themselves as sharing
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/05/25/mississippi/index.html;
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a membership in an interest or identity (public housing residents,
cash-strapped bus riders)—and may well be aided by sharing a
geographic concentration as well as a ready means to share
information. Many housing and land use issues are amenable to
community lawyering because the residents live together for many
years, permitting them to interact with the same government
agencies and property developers in a stable legal environment.
Community lawyering may also serve better than lawyer-led
strategies in situations where a well-defined community can
achieve a ‘repeat player’ position and interact frequently with a
particular agency or entity such as a developer, employer or
housing authority. In such a situation, the relationships of
political processes may tend to be more effective than resorting to
the judiciary. Political solutions generated by a mobilized
community may well deliver more positive outcomes for people
than reformist litigation. 112
There remains a role for social justice lawyers to frame
litigation designed to change policies that afflict a class of people.
Sadly, many poor people do not occupy communities having the
features of shared identity and cohesion. Even if geographically
near, community organizing may well be a necessary predicate to
community lawyering where individuals share common burdens
but have yet to appreciate that commonality. And for many of the
ills that trouble low-income people in the United States, legal
action may be suitable where organizing has not and, perhaps,
cannot occur.
For example, following Hurricane Katrina,
thousands of people were caught up in struggles with
governmental agencies such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the Housing Authorityof New Orleans,
insurance companies, and social services. While the impact on
their lives was huge, the people affected had insufficient tools to
identify or communicate with each other, name or categorize the
policies that compounded the harm they suffered, or address their
concerns to decision makers. Although they shared common legal
issues, they were far flung geographically, making community
organizing problematic. In that setting, class action litigation
presented itself as the more strategic choice among lawyering
tactics. 113
112. In Maryland, a class action on behalf of all African American public
housing tenants in the City of Baltimore resulted in a partial consent decree
that led to a structured negotiation between class counsel and the Housing
Authority in the siting of new public housing in neighborhoods of greater
opportunity. Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398,424-28 (D. Md. 2005).
Nevertheless, substantially more units have been demolished than have been
replaced. Id. at 511-21.
113. See, e.g., Ridgely v. FEMA, No. Civ. A. 07-2146, 2007 WL 1728725 (E.D.
La. June 13, 2007) (certifying a class of plaintiffs who challenged FEMA’s
recoupment procedures as arbitrary); McWaters v FEMA, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802,
822-28 (E.D. La. 2006) (ordering FEMA to stop requiring Small Business

In any of these situations of insufficient community
organization, well-crafted litigation informed by collaborative
community relationships between lawyer and client can be
successful in the narrow legal sense of producing a form of
enforceable relief. Furthermore, success in courts or legislatures
on behalf of classes of citizens is an important expression of
peoples’ claims to justice and equality, with both material and
symbolic significance in refashioning the norms of society.
Lawyers will readily agree that just because litigation is an
important hammer in the toolkit for justice does not make it the
instrument of choice. Throughout the history of public interest
law practice in the United States, lawyers have been both lionized
and criticized for operating as elites who have used legalism in the
name of the disenfranchised, to demand individual rights and
formal legal equality. 114 But this is no longer the time of our
fathers’ and mothers’ public interest practice. A mounting chorus
calls for a plethora of strategies and capacities, as well as
interdisciplinary collaborations and coalition building, by which to
redress the injustices of today. 115
Lawyering and organizing, in tandem, offer several
contributions to the collaborative social justice work of people’s
organizations.
Tactical Pluralism. Throughout the long tradition of “public
interest lawyering,” lawyers have embraced tactical pluralism and
have worked all along a continuum of tactics from traditional
adversarial techniques to media and public relations campaigns,
popular education, and grassroots organizing.
Norm Setting. Litigation and legislative advocacy that elicits
a declaration of legal rights by the courts or legislature of a
jurisdiction has a uniquely important role in forging new norms,
particularly when this is the outcome of popular collective
action. 116
Administration loan applications as prerequisite to other assistance
applications and limiting FEMA termination of hotel assistance).
114. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of “Extra-Legal” Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 949-52
(2007).
115. See Rose Voyvodic & Mary Medcalf, Advancing Social Justice Through
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commitment to social justice encompassing, beyond traditional casework,
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Collaborations Across Knowledge Sets.
“Community
lawyering” entails collaborations with people situated in their
community groups. Community cognizance is the source for
identifying issues for collective action and for evaluation of the role
of legal strategies in addressing the concerned community’s
priorities. Community lawyering practices, as depicted in law
school clinics and beyond, focus on empowering communities,
promoting economic and social justice, and fostering systemic
change.
The collaboration is essential to transcending
individualized claims in order to promote and achieve such
change.
Representation as Mobilization. Much of the collaboration
embraced by community lawyers could be characterized as a
version of the client participation valued in conventional
conceptions of ‘client centered lawyering,’ but this does not
adequately capture the democracy-building principle or practice of
lawyers working with marginalized people’s groups described as
mobilization lawyering by Lucie White, Sameer Ashar, and
others. 117 “Mobilization lawyering” reframes the participatory
element in two ways that are important for Alinsky’s democracy
prescription; first, it directs the action of clients and lawyers to
correct the deficiencies in majoritarian democracy, through
opening up access to the political decision making in which the
client group is underrepresented; and second, by providing support
for local grassroots organizing outside of formal political
process. 118
Frequently, if implicitly, this work requires long-term
commitments by the lawyers to the client communities, sustained
by relationships with clients that necessarily reckon with the
social, economic, and political contexts of the collaborators’ lives.
Typically, community lawyers share with their clients the
commitment to creative, collaborative work for solving the complex
problems that constrain and exclude clients from the blessings of
liberty and equality that Alinsky believed would flow from people’s
organizations. 119
CO-CITIZEN LAW PRACTICES: LAW ALONGSIDE ORGANIZING
Alinsky’s prescription for his country was that we practice
democracy seriously. His democratic vision turned on his faith in
the potential of ordinary people to partake in democratic practices
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of inclusion, information sharing, deliberation, collective
assessment, strategy, joint action, and mutual accountability. I
think he would be surprised to observe the current practices
among scholar-practitioners to take this prescription to heart in
their work as lawyers.
Perhaps the several strands of rebellious lawyering, cause
lawyering, community lawyering, and mobilization lawyering 120
join to form an “emerging tradition” of “lawyering for
democracy,” 121 as co-citizens. This frame shapes the relationships
of lawyer and community, and of law and organizing, with regard
to the ends and means of the collaborative work and of the agency
of the participants in that work. These lawyers emphasize working
with clients and the clients’ groups, communities, and allies.
Lawyers and clients working as co-citizens are not likely to
aim primarily for legal reform, although that may well be
necessary to achieve the principal aim. Neither rejecting remedies
at law nor achieving change through litigation, yet skeptical as to
the reach of litigation isolated from public action and social
movements, the object of the collaborative work is ultimately the
transformation of living conditions “for those whom our political
economy and society routinely deny dignity and equal justice.” 122
Instead, these lawyers favor multiple, multilateral efforts by
various participants in a variety of arenas. The tactical toolkit
encompasses litigation, legislative change, lobbying, community
and popular education, media campaigns, political mobilization,
and organizing as a range of options to assess and deploy in such
combinations as each context warrants. 123
Co-citizen lawyers “do not see themselves as saviors,
protectors, or instructors of befuddled victims, nor as preeminent
engines or engineers of social change.” 124 To lawyers working
within this frame, clients are active partners in working to solve
their problems.
These lawyers work alongside clients—
individuals, organized groups, and informal associations—and the
allies they enlist, in multidimensional efforts to advocate for
justice.
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